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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to substantiate the Education-Growth relationship with a view to evaluate Pakistan’s 
Education Policy over the last two decades. With a view to the inadequacy of the generally used measures of 
education, we first estimate the no enrollment ratios, the average schooling years, the standard deviation of 
education and educational gini for Pakistan and its four provinces across gender domains as measures of the 
level and spread of schooling for 1973-1998. Then using these measures we estimate some standard 
econometric relations to understand the evolution of the distribution of education, its impact on economic 
growth and the role of government policy therein. The paper confirms the existence of a negative relationship 
between average schooling years and inequality in educational opportunities, along with a strong support for 
the existence of the Education Kuznets Curve both as a time series and as a cross sectional phenomenon for 
Pakistan and its four provinces across gender domains. The paper also corroborates the education-growth 
hypothesis through panel estimation of a modified Macro-Mincerian function. We find that the commitment 
of the public sector to education provision has a very strong impact both on educational inequality and on the 
rate of economic growth. Our estimates establish the failure of Pakistan’s education policy on account of the 
inefficiency of current education expenditure and shows that if the declining commitment to education does 
not reverse and the public sector does not take care of its inefficiency, then Pakistan will suffer in terms of 
reduced economic growth and high educational inequality for future generations. The paper recommends that 
Pakistan’s education reforms should focus on primary education provision for all rather than on higher 
education for a limited segment of the population. 
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EDUCATION INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
FRAMEWORK  FOR  THE  EVALUATION  OF  PAKISTAN’S  
EDUCATION POLICY 
RUBINA HASSAN AND MUHAMMAD SHAHZAD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Education, Its Distribution and Economic Growth 
As economic activity becomes increasingly knowledge-based, the average level of education 
attainment and disparities in educational opportunities play a more important role in determining 
both the growth prospects of the economy and the distribution of income therein. From a theoretical 
standpoint, an increase in average educational attainment results in a relative increase in the supply 
of skilled work force, which, in turn, enhances average labour productivity and increases the rate of 
economic growth [Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1993,1997; Barro and Sala- i-Martin, 1995; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1998]. The resulting higher levels of output tend to represent a higher inequality in the 
distribution of incomes, and therefore more poverty, if equal educational opportunities are not 
provided to all [Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Banabou, 1996a; Thomas, Wang and Fan, 2000; 
Lopez, Thomas and Wang, 2002]. The slightest concern with equitable growth for the current and 
future generations, therefore, cannot remain oblivious of the state of human development. 
 
Education and its equitable distribution therefore make for important ingredients in a poverty-
reducing growth strategy. Education, however, is also otherwise important. It is the key to 
improvement in the quality of social life. It contributes to the improvement of general health 
conditions. It helps reduce the social, cultural and ethnic divides among a people. And it facilitates 
the creation of a more responsible, decentralized, civilized and globalized community. The positive 
externalities thus created through education provision further enhance the processes of economic 
growth and development. 
 
Education in Pakistan 
Recognizing the meritorious role of education in social and economic development, successive 
political governments in Pakistan have shown concern over providing educational facilities for the 
general masses. Pakistan’s education policy, however, has remained unsuccessful. Pakistan is still 
among the countries where the level and the spread of education are poor, the level of illiteracy is 
very high and gender inequality in educational opportunities persists [World Bank, 2003, 2004; 
Government of Pakistan, 1998, 2004]. Apart from this, Pakistan has only gained increased social 
disharmony and earned a higher income inequality out of continued investment in education 
provision for about twenty years1. It is thus evident that Pakistan has so far not been able to reap any 
benefits, direct or indirect, from the provision of educational opportunities to the general masses. 
 
This paper addresses two very important issues in respect of the above. First, we contend that the  
measurement of education in terms of an overall literacy rate and growth in number of schools, 
number of teachers and number of enrollments is not sufficient to understand the efficiency of 
education expenditures. These statistics only represent the supply of educational services and are not 
an adequate way to measure the output and effectiveness of education programs [see section II 
below]. For the latter purpose, we estimate a set of parameters that determine the level and 
                                                 
1  Education gained priority in public expenditure programs in 1985 when the ‘NAI-ROSHNI Schooling Scheme’ was 
launched. Since then, successive political governments have kept the pace of education spending under different 
headings, but similar contents. In 1985, the income gini coefficient was 34.94% which increased to 40.85% in 1998. 
(Income Gini estimates have been taken from Hassan, R. and M. Shahzad, “An Econometric Appraisal of Poverty 
and Inequality in Pakistan”, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Karachi, 2004). 
  
distribution of education in Pakistan. We compute these parameters to estimate the distribution of 
education using public sector education institution’s enrolment data over the period 1973-1998 for 
Pakistan and its four provinces across gender domains 2. Secondly, we seek to establish quantitative 
estimates of the importance of different dimensions of education for economic growth. In this 
connection, we also estimate some standard empirical relationships among the estimated education 
statistics with a view towards the evaluation of Pakistan’s education policies over the last two 
decades. These estimates also provide the cornerstone of a successful education policy. 
 
In the following section, we review some of the standard methods used in literature to measure 
various aspects of education. This is followed in section III by the description of the methodology to 
measure the level and spread of educational opportunities along with the specification of regression 
equations to be estimated. Section IV presents the results of our computation and estimation 
exercises for Pakistan and its four provinces across gender domains. The paper concludes with a 
brief discussion of its policy implications in section V. 
 
II. THE MEAUSREMENT OF EDUCATION 
Education is a multifaceted phenomenon. As such, a wide variety of methods are used to measure 
different aspects of education. These include, among others, enrollment ratios, education attainment 
indicators, quality of education indicators and measures of absolute and relative dispersion of 
education. 
 
                                                 
2  Before 1998, the Pakistan Education Statistics, NEMIS / AEPAM, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan 
presented education statistics for only public sector institutions. After 1998, the NEMIS started publishing education 
statistics for both private and public sector institutions. The two, hence, are not comparable. This is one reason why 
we have limited our analysis only up to 1998. 
 
The ‘quality of education’ literature emphasizes the importance of differences in the quality of 
education while making comparisons among the schooling attributes of different populations. It 
focuses on comparing student-teacher ratios, expenditures on teacher’s wages, spending on books 
and materials (the input approach) and objective examination’s results across different segments of a 
population (the output approach) [For details, see Behrman and Birdsall, 1983; Lockheed and 
Verspoor, 1991; and Hanushek and Kim, 1995]. As we are using only Pakistan’s public sector 
institutions’ data for the present purpose, this supply-oriented debate does not concern us here. 
 
Measures of the level of education attained by a population can be obtained using either the 
Enrollment Ratios [Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992] or Average School Attainment 
[Barro and Lee, 1993, 1997; Thomas, et al, 2000]. One of the key merits of enrolment ratios is that 
they are easily computable given the population and enrolment data. However, these ratios only 
measure the access to education of the population and are, accordingly, only flow measures that 
cannot completely account for the stock of human capital already accumulated [Thomas, et al, 
2000]. Unlike enrollment ratios, school attainment is a stock variable, which represents the average 
stock of human capital accumulated by an arbitrary person belonging to a population. School 
attainment can be measured as the mean of the distribution of schooling for a certain population 
[Barro and Lee, 1993, 1997; Thomas, et al, 2000]. 
 
The distributional dimension of education is extremely important for both welfare considerations and 
for production. “If an asset, say physical capital, is freely traded across firms in a competitive 
market, its marginal product will be equalized through free-market mechanism. As a result, its 
contribution to output will not be affected by its distribution across firms or individuals. If an asset is 
not completely tradable, however, then the marginal product of the asset will not be equalized across 
individuals, and there is an aggregation problem. In this case, aggregate production function depends 
not only on the average stock of that asset but also on its distribution” [Thomas et al, 2000]. Because 
education is only partially tradable, the average level of education attainment is not sufficient to 
reflect the characteristics of a country’s human capital. We need to look beyond averages and 
investigate both the absolute and relative dispersions of human capital. 
 
Inequality in the distribution of educational opportunities can be explained both in terms of absolute 
and relative measures. The Standard Deviation of Schooling is a measure of absolute dispersion of 
educational attainment that has been used to document educational inequality [see, for example, Lam 
and Levinson, 1991; Ram, 1990]. It describes the spread of educational opportunities around mean 
schooling for a certain population. One hypothesis in this connection is the existence of the 
Education-Kuznets-Curve. The education Kuznets curve relationship implies that as the average 
level of schooling increases, educational inequality, as measured by the standard deviation of 
schooling, first increases, and after reaching a peak starts to decline. The turning point of the curve 
may vary for populations with differing schooling distributions [Ram, 1990]. Like most measures of 
absolute dispersion, the standard deviation of schooling is also dependent on the scale of 
measurement. This means that if each individual’s education attainment changes in the same 
proportionate way, the standard deviation of schooling would also change. This negative attribute of 
the standard deviation measure of inequality limits its use as a proper indicator of distributional 
inequality [Litchfield, 1999]. 
 
There are many ways of measuring relative distributional inequality for any given population. The 
term relative inequality disqualifies all measures that are either scale or population dependent, 
asymmetric and that do not pass the Pigou-Dalton transfer-principle [Cowell, 1998; Litchfield, 
1999]. Several classes of measures satisfy these properties. The Generalized Entropy class of 
measures (Mean-Log Deviation, Theil Index of Inequality and the Coefficient of Variation), the  
Atkinson class of measures and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke ‘P-measures’ all provide efficient and 
ordinally equivalent way of measuring relative inequality. The most common and useful of the 
measures of relative inequality is the Gini-coefficient. It is a simple-to-compute and efficient way of 
measuring relative inequality based on the weighted-sum of absolute differences of some attribute 
(usually income) of a population [Cowell, 1998]. In a game theoretic framework, the Gini coefficient 
can be understood as the expected loss to an individual from ‘trading’ his endowments with a 
randomly chosen person in the economy [Yitzhaki, 1997]. 
 
Educational Gini is similar to income gini in that it measures inequality in the distribution of 
schooling for a certain population. However, unlike standard income gini coefficient that measures 
the distribution of a continuous and unbounded variable (income), the educational gini coefficient 
measures the distribution of a discrete and bounded variable. Education attainment cannot be less 
than zero; it takes on only discrete values and has an upper bound (usually between 15 to 20 years of 
education). Furthermore, the measurement of educational gini must take into consideration the 
proportion of population that does not receive any schooling at all [Thomas et al, 2000]. 
 
Educational Gini has been used as a measure of educational inequality in various studies. Earlier 
attempts to document education inequality focused on computing the gini coefficient for education 
finance data [Maas and Criel, 1982; Rosthal, 1978]. Sheret [1988] was the first attempt to use 
enrollment data for Papua New Guinea to measure inequality in educational opportunities. This 
approach was furthered after the publication of ‘schooling cycles’ data [Psacharopoulos and 
Arriagada, 1986] and was used by López, Thomas and Wang [1998] and Thomas et al [2000]. 
 
III. METHODOLIGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Level and Distribution of Education 
In this section, we explain the construction of the variables that we will use to measure the level and 
spread of educational opportunities in Pakistan. Consider a population P  with C  mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive age cohorts Cpppp ,...,,, 210 . The population has an education 
system S  consisting of Jj , . . . . . ,2 ,1 ,0=  education attainment levels each denoted by jS . The 
number of children enrolled at each education attainment level is denoted by jE  where 
Jj , . . . . . ,2 ,1= . Let 0p  be the group of children with ages 5 to 9 years and assume that children with 
education attainments 4321 ,,, SSSS  belong to this age cohort. Define 432100 EEEEE ----=p
3. 0E  
represents the number of children who do not get the opportunity to receive any education at all. 
The jE ’s, Jj , . . . . . ,2 ,1 ,0= , represent the complete distribution of enrollments. Finally, define 
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3  This is in accordance with the definition used by the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, Government of Pakistan. 
The information set [ ]ÀSºL ,  is all that we need to derive the statistics required to determine the 
level of education attainment and the various attributes of the distribution of educational 
opportunities. The stock mean of the distribution of enrollments (Average Schooling Years), the 
proportion of un-enrolled children (No Enrollment Ratio), the dispersion in educational attainment 
(Standard Deviation of Schooling) and the Educational Gini are respectively defined as: 
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------------------------------------------------------ Figure No. 1 ------------------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, the Lorenz Curve of Education ( LCE ) can be identified as the set: 
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The straight line from the origin to the top left corner represents the egalitarian line. 
As )0,(),( 000 PSP = , therefore unlike the standard income Lorenz curve, the LCE  begins at 0P  
                                                 
4  This definition of the Educational Gini Index is in line with Thomas, et al [2000]. For computational purposes we 
use the matrix version of this equation: 
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along the horizontal axis and represents the cumulative distribution of schooling attained by a certain 
cumulative proportion of the population. The education gini can also be interpreted as the percentage 
deviation of LCE  from the egalitarian line. 
 
In order to compute E.1 to E.5, we use a value of 14=J . The fourteen groups, in order, represent no 
education at all, then class one education up to class ten education, intermediate level education, 
graduation level education, and postgraduate or university level education. The fourteen groups are 
thus collectively inclusive and mutually exclusive for the concerned population. We assign discrete 
numbers to each schooling level. Thus, 00 =S  represents no schooling at all, 55 =S  represents five 
years of schooling, 1211 =S  represents intermediate education while 1613 =S  represents post-
graduate or university level education. This is a deviation from the standard method that has so far 
been used in literature to measure educational attainment and educational inequality. The standard 
approach is to set 7=J 5 and then make computations based on ‘schooling cycles’ data of 
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) [Barro, 1991; Thomas et al, 2000]. The primary purpose this 
approach serves is to take care of the number of dropouts each year, so that education attainment 
indicators are true representatives of the population’s human capital endowments. As we are using 
enrollment data for each schooling level of the entire population, our approach automatically takes 
care of the latter and we can make the calculations independent of ‘schooling cycles’ data. 
 
Econometric Framework for Education Policy Evaluation 
The measured attributes of the level and spread of education enable us to develop the framework for 
the evaluation of public policy towards education. The first important task that we confront is the 
                                                 
5  The seven categories are no schooling, partial primary, complete primary, partial secondary, complete secondary, 
partial tertiary and complete tertiary.   
establishment of the quantitative importance of various dimensions of education for economic 
growth. For this purpose, we specify a hybrid of the standard growth equation of Barro and Sala- i-
Martin [1995] and the first-differenced Macro-Mincerian equation of Kreuger and Lindahl [2001] 
slightly modified to take care of endogenously changing returns to education. The equation reads: 
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The left hand side represents the rate of growth of per-capita income, while the right hand side 
variables include lagged real per-capita income, lagged average schooling and its square, first 
difference of average schooling, educational inequality and the ratio of total education expenditures 
to nominal GDP. The last variable represents the commitment of the public sector to providing 
educational facilities for the general masses. The coefficient 4c  measures the baseline average rate 
of return to education while the value of the derivative 1,32
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change in the return to education in period t . The coefficient 5c  measures the impact of inequality in 
the distribution of educational opportunities on economic growth while 6c measures the effectiveness 
of government spending on education to economic growth.  
 
Once the importance of the distribution of educational opportunities is established, we attempt to 
signify the explanatory variables associated with educational inequality. The baseline relationship 
rests on Thomas et al [2000] that finds a very strong negative association between inequality in the 
distribution of schooling opportunities and average schooling years. We modify this relationship to 
allow for the evaluation of the efficiency of public education expenditures. The equation that we 
estimate is: 
 
itititititE EEDLnaEECLnaASYaaG e+×+×+×+= )()( 3210      E. 7 
 
The equation states that educational inequality depends on average schooling years and on public 
sector education expenditures on current and development accounts. We estimate this equation for 
Pakistan and its four provinces across gender domains. 
 
The final regression equation is the famous Education Kuznets Curve. The relationship states that as 
average school attainment increases, the standard deviation of education first increases and declines 
afterwards. The relationship can be observed both as a time series and as a cross sectional 
phenomenon [Londoño, 1990; Ram, 1990; Thomas et al, 2000].  
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The estimated equation can be used to find 
2
1
2b
bASY -=* : the optimal value of average schooling 
that public authorities need to target. A comparison of current average schooling with this optimal 
value could then be made to set the direction for public education policy. 
 
In order to estimate E.6, E7 and E.8, we use data on average schooling, educational gini and 
standard deviation of schooling constructed for each province and Pakistan across gender domains as 
explained above. Estimates of real per-capita GDP for Pakistan and its four provinces have been 
obtained from Bengali [1995, 2002] while education expenditures on current and development 
accounts have been obtained from Federal Bureau of Statistics [1998]. The next section presents the 
results of our computation and estimation exercises.  
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Time Profile of Estimated Education Statistics 
The public and private sectors share education provision in Pakistan rather inequitably. The share of 
Public Sector institutions in total education institutions is estimated to be about 78%, and this ratio is 
assumed to remain almost intact over the next few years [PRSP, 2001]. Furthermore, private sector 
shares education provision mostly in urban areas of Pakistan and educating the rural masses remains 
the responsibility of the public sector. Even in the urban areas, private schools are usually attended 
by the relatively high- income groups of society, while children belonging to the middle and lower 
income groups usually attend public schools. Accordingly, public sector remains the major supplier 
of education services to the general masses in Pakistan. 
 
------------------------------------------------ Figure No. 2 ------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The graph on the right shows the trends in no enrollment ratio for Pakistan and its four provinces 
across gender domains. Table no. 1 provides estimates of the same for some selected years. 
Although the NER’s have registered a decline over the entire sample period, most of this reduction 
has taken place during 1985-1995. Before 1985, the NER’s were quite stagnant and after 1995, they 
have either stagnated again or have registered an increase in value. It is not difficult to see that the 
reduction in NER’s is not significant enough to guarantee education for all in any short run. The 
number of children without educational opportunities is increasing in every population segment 
throughout the sample period. Thus, the number of children aged between 5 and 9 years who did not 
enroll in public schools in Pakistan increased from 7.81 million to 9.92 million between 1990 and 
1998. This means that every year, about 0.265 million children get added to the pool of un-enrolled. 
If population in this age-cohort grows at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent (computed as average 
5-9 years population growth during 1990-1998), then each year about 0.461 million children get 
added to the population. This means that with given education provision structure in the public 
sector, only 0.196 million children (equal to 0.461 less 0.265) can be accommodated to receive 
education each year. It needs only simple arithmetic to see that education expenditure need to be 
more than doubled in every respect before we can say that we are moving towards global primary 
education in Pakistan. 
 
The table also shows the gender differences in NER’s. For every population segment, we find that 
the gender gaps in no enrollment ratio were either increasing or stagnant before 1990. Following 
1990, there has been a significant decline in gender gaps in NER’s. This has mainly occurred either 
because of the stagnation of male NER’s along side a reduction in female NER’s (for e.g. in 
Baluchistan) or because of a more than proportionate increase in female enrollments as compared to 
male enrollments (Punjab and NWFP) or because of a reduction in male enrollments accompanied 
by an increase in female enrolments (Sind). Ignoring the shift in the preferences of  
 
---------------------------------------------------- Table No. 1 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
the masses away from public schooling for male children, a comparison of the estimates of NER’s 
and associated gender gaps for 1985 and 1998 reveals that much of the changes in the gender gaps 
have taken place through a reduction in female NER’s for every population segment. Thus, the 
reduction in gender gaps in NER’s is not associated with any significant increase in overall 
enrollments in every population segment. This again reveals the inefficiency of the public sector in 
delivering the merit commodity. 
 
Table No. 2 below shows the growth in real per-capita income and the ratio of education expenditure 
to GDP for each of the four provinces and Pakistan. The small values of the percentage of public 
expenditures on education to GDP reflect the degree of adherence of the public sector to meritorious 
education provision. Again, we find that the same percentages were stagnant before 1985, increased 
between 1985-95 and are on a decline since then. It is thus not surprising if the general state of 
education is worsening in every population sub-group in Pakistan. Table No. 3 below and the 
accompanying graphs highlight what the fragile commitment of the public authorities to education 
provision has translated into over the last decade. 
 
---------------------------------------------------- Table No. 2 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
The graphs below show the time profile of average schooling years and educational gini coefficients 
for Pakistan and its four provinces over the entire sample period. Again we find that most of the 
improvement in the state of education in Pakistan and its sub-populations took place between 1980 
and 1995 when the proportion of public expenditure on education increased. Before 1980 both 
average schooling and inequality in educational opportunities are stagnant. Since 1995, education 
statistics reveal a general stagnation of the state of education in Pakistan and its sub-populations as 
shown by the shifting of the Lorenz curve of education for Pakistan farther from the egalitarian line. 
 
----------------------------------------------- Figures 3, 4 and 5 ------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table No. 3 provides estimates of educational gini coefficient, average years of schooling and the 
standard deviation of schooling for selected years for Pakistan and its four provinces across gender 
domains. The average years of schooling estimate the mean of the distribution of schooling at any 
point in time. The gini coefficient and the standard deviation of schooling measure the dispersion of 
education attainment across populations. The tables provide quantitative estimates of the trends in 
educational attainment and its distribution and highlight the differences in schooling attributes of the 
four provinces across gender domains.  
-------------------------------------------------Table No. 3 ------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Education, Its Distribution and Economic Growth 
In the previous section, we presented the results of our computations regarding the level and spread 
of education. This section presents results on the quantitative importance of the various aspects of 
education for economic growth. 
 
Table No. 4 below presents panel estimates of equation E.6. The Hausman test for fixed vs. random 
effects indicates a better fit of the fixed effects model. All coefficients are robust and significant and 
bear the expected signs. The negative coefficient of lagged average schooling years indicates that the 
returns to education are declining in Pakistan across all sub-populations, while the positive sign on 
the square of lagged average schooling shows that higher average schooling endogenously increases 
the returns to education. The estimates show a very large and significant negative impact of 
education inequality on economic growth. Similarly, our estimates also highlight the importance of 
public sector education spending in increasing the rate of economic growth. The LM statistic 
indicates that a mall amount of heterogeneity is still left in the residuals and the corresponding F-
tests indicate that a more general model with cross section specific coefficients be estimated. 
However, as the results of the two were not very much different, the latter are not reported. 
------------------------------------------------- Figure No. 6 ------------------------------------------------------ 
 
It is important to see what our estimates mean in practical terms. A commonly held belief by the 
general public as well as the authorities in Pakistan is that people do not prefer to educate their 
children and instead seek some earning-activity for them. The graph on the right offers an 
explanation for this. We find that the elasticity of income to education has remained negative for all 
cross sections of the population for much of the sample period. The exception to this is only Punjab 
for which the elasticity became positive after 1990. The above tables show that Punjab is the district 
with highest average education attainment, least gender disparity and least inequality in educational 
opportunities. The conclusion is plain; if government authorities increase the ratio of education 
spending, aim specifically at increasing average school attainment, and reducing educational 
inequalities, then education can be made a more attractive option for future earners and the rate of 
economic growth can be increased through increased productivity of these future earners. 
 
Secondly, educational inequality turns out to be a very important factor that limits the rate of 
economic growth. As a matter of fact, public sector education programs in Pakistan (and in many 
countries of the world) have never been evaluated in terms of their distributional impact. Our 
estimates suggest that public authorities should monitor the distributional impact of their education 
programs and make efforts to reduce educational disparities as much as possible. As education 
inequality turns out to have the strongest impact on the rate of growth, this is the most efficient way 
to achieve a higher growth prospects for all future generations. 
 
Table No. 5 and Table No. 6 provide explanations for why education inequality is high and what can 
be done by public authorities to reduce educational inequalities. Our estimates indicate a better fit of 
the random effects model for both overall and gender disaggregated panel regressions. Results show 
that average schooling has a very strong negative impact over reducing educational inequalities. 
Secondly, and more importantly, we find that education expenditures on current and development 
accounts affect educational inequality asymmetrically. Thus, an increase in education expenditures 
on current account simply increases educational inequality while an increase in education 
expenditures on development account decreases educational inequality. The current expenditures on 
education consist of the salaries of the teachers, rents of buildings and other fringe benefits for the 
teaching staff. Over the last twenty years, there have been numerous instances where ‘ghost schools’ 
have been created and ‘ghost teachers’ have been appointed6. These simply do not translate into 
education for the masses and therefore become patches of inefficiency in the whole structure of 
public education provision. The positive sign on the coefficient of current education expenditures 
simply indicates the generality of this occurrence and hence bears testimony to the inefficiency of 
education expenditures on current account of the public sector over the last twenty years across all 
population domains. In contrast to this, whenever a new school is established or new faculty 
appointed, there is a net increase in enrollments that contributes to the improvement in education 
indicators. 
 
                                                 
6  Ghost School and Ghost Teacher are commonly referred terms in Pakistan. They refer to situations where a school 
has been established and a teacher has been appointed in official documents but the same are not functioning due to 
some or the other reason.  
The gender disaggregated results also confirm to the above. In addition, they show that public 
education programs are more effective towards female education rather than male education. Thus 
current education expenditures contribute more to increase inequality among the females as 
compared to males and education expenditures on development account contribute more to reduce 
inequality among the females as compared with the males. Perhaps, this indicates the intensity of the 
efforts of the public sector towards eradicating gender disparities in education. 
 
One more feature of our estimates is that the coefficients of education expenditures on current and 
development accounts are almost equal in magnitude but bear opposite signs. This means that the 
impact of a one dollar increase in development expenditure is completely offset by a one dollar 
increase in current expenditures. It is therefore not surprising if Pakistan has not been able to benefit 
out of its education provision programs. Furthermore, the estimates show that if the current trends 
are allowed to continue, then all public sector education programs would result in zero overall 
benefits regarding reduction in educational inequalities and enhancing economic growth. 
 
The Education Kuznets Curve 
Table No. 7 provides estimates of the Education Kuznets Curve both by province and by years. The 
Education-Kuznets curve relationship indicates that as the average years of schooling increase the 
standard deviation of education first increases and only then registers a decline. Estimates show that 
there are significant differences among different provinces regarding the standard deviation of 
schooling. These differences, however, are best captured in the fixed effects model. For each of the 
provinces, we find a significant positive non- linear relationship between average years of schooling 
and the standard deviation of schooling (SDS).  
The estimated fixed effect relationship indicates that the standard deviation of schooling would start 
declining (in the short run) after every population domain of Pakistan has attained approximately 4.3 
years of schooling7. The standard deviation of schooling simply measures the dispersion of school 
attainment levels attained by different proportions of a population. Its value can increase if more 
children get enrolled in primary as well as secondary classes. If this could somehow be attained, may 
be through re-enrolment of the dropouts, then not only the standard deviation but also the average 
school attainment of the population would start increasing. However, once all dropouts get re-
enrolled and there does not remain any further possibility of a simultaneous increase in enrolments at 
all levels, the standard deviation of schooling would start declining. Our estimates show that this 
would be the case when, on average, Pakistan has attained something close to global primary 
education. 
 
The table also provides estimates of the time-specific Education Kuznets Curves. These can be seen 
to follow the random effects model, probably due to the large number of fixed effect coefficients. 
Again, we find that the optimal inter-temporal level of education attainment after which the 
dispersion in educational attainments would start declining, is about 4 years of schooling. 
 
A comparative look at the Gini Coefficients of Education, No Enrolment Ratios, Average Years of 
Schooling and the Standard Deviation of Schooling along with our estimated regressions yields 
some interesting insights regarding education policy. When a large proportion of the population is 
out of schools, average schooling would be low while educational gini would be very high. At this 
stage, helping more people to become educated would reduce educational inequalities while it would 
                                                 
7  This is simply the maximum value the estimate function would take. 
 
simultaneously increase the spread of education. This would happen because a bulk of the 
population will have very low education attainment while some proportion would have attained 
higher education simultaneously. What is needed at this stage is an increase in education 
expenditures on development account, so that although the scale dependent standard deviation is 
increasing, inequality in educational opportunities in relative terms continues to decline8. At a later 
stage, when average schooling has attained a certain optimum level, roughly 4 years of schooling in 
case of Pakistan, the spread of education would start declining with increase in average schooling of 
the population. The same would then translate into a higher growth path for all future generations. 
The optimum level of schooling for the entire population at one point in time can then be interpreted 
as some baseline educational attainment level that should be targeted by the authorities. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Recognizing the key role of education for social and economic prosperity and identifying the adverse 
situation of education in Pakistan, we set ourselves two tasks in this paper. First, we contend that the 
conventional approach of measuring the success of public sector education programs in terms of 
increased enrolments, more schools, more teachers and growing literacy rates is at best insufficient 
to depict the true picture of human development. We use population and enrollment data to measure 
the efficiency of public sector education programs in terms of no enrollment ratios, average 
schooling years, standard deviation of schooling and educational gini coefficient. Secondly, we 
estimate a number of regressions to explain the evolution of educational inequality and its 
relationship with economic growth, with a view to ascertain implications for Pakistan’s education 
policy.  
                                                 
8  As development expenditures increase, they force the authorities to increase current expenditures in future. The 
inefficiency of current expenditures can then only be circumvented through a monitoring and control system that 
limits the abuse of resources devoted to meritorious education provision.  
 Empirical estimates of all education statistics have been obtained for the period 1973-1998 for 
Pakistan and its four provinces across gender domains. The statistics reveal that the general state of 
education and human development in Pakistan was stagnant before 1985 with high educational 
disparities and low average school attainment. Then with the onset of the interest of the public sector 
in providing education to the general masses, education indicator statistics started improving; 
average educational attainment increased, educational inequality declined, gender gaps in no 
enrollment declined and the standard deviation in schooling increased. However, as public sector 
education programs lost their efficiency and the public sector itself lost interest in providing 
meritorious education, the general state of education deteriorated after 1995. Within the limits 
imposed by data availability, we cannot deduce whether this worsening of the state of education is 
real or reflects merely a shift towards pub lic schooling. 
  
The paper presents quantitative estimates of the importance of education statistics on economic 
growth and corroborates the education-growth hypotheses through panel estimation of a modified 
Macro-Mincerian equation. The fixed effect estimates of the growth regression indicate that 
educational inequality is the strongest factor that limits economic growth in the case of Pakistan. The 
regression also explains why educating children is not a general priority among Pakistani parents on 
the basis of a significant negative elasticity of income to schooling for all populations segments 
across all time periods (with the exception of Punjab after 1990). Finally, our estimates show that the 
commitment of the public sector to education provision also exerts a positive influence on the rate of 
economic growth. 
 
We also show that the high levels of educational inequality in Pakistan are primarily due to low 
average schooling, inefficient current education expenditures on education and low level of 
development expenditures on education. In this connection, we find that the public sector education 
expenditures are more effective in reducing education inequality for the females rather than for the 
males. Nevertheless, the equal magnitudes and opposite signs of the current and development 
expenditures for education in the regression equation nullify the overall impact of public sector 
education spending on educational inequalities. 
 
The paper also confirms the existence of the Kuznets Curve relation both across provinces and over 
time. The relationship implies that the standard deviation of education would keep increasing until 
average educational attainment level reaches 4.3 years of schooling. Once global primary education 
has been attained, the possibility of a simultaneous increase in enrollments at all levels would cease 
and the standard deviation of education would start declining. 
 
Finally, we argue that the most efficient education policy for Pakistan would be to aim for 
attainment of primary education for all. In this connection, it is important that the public sector 
eliminates inefficiencies that underlie its current education expenditures and simultaneously increase 
development expenditures on education provision. This on the one hand, will reduce the number of 
children that do not have the opportunity to receive any schooling, while on the other would also 
help in reducing educational inequality. Once educational inequalities are reduced, average 
schooling has increased and the public sector’s commitment to educating the general masses is 
firmly established, the returns to education would increase to become positive for every sub-group of 
the population and would thereby translate into a higher growth prospects for the future generations.  
 It is important to note that although the National Education Policy 1998-2010 [Government of 
Pakistan, 1998] identifies the importance of primary education and stresses on ‘attainment of a 
respectable level of literacy’ and ‘eliminating gender disparities at all levels’ it does not spell out 
any means by which this may be made possible. Fundamentally, the National Education Policy does 
not address the problem of inefficiency of public sector education programs associated with the 
existence of ‘ghost schools’, ‘ghost students’ and ‘ghost teachers’. It talks about the doubling of 
education expenditures in relation to GDP but mainly through an increase in current expenditures 
(for e.g. teacher training, salary increases, new appointments of teachers, etc.).  
 
In stark contrast to what we have argued above, the National Education Policy focuses on 
diversifying secondary education, making intermediate level education more info-tech oriented, 
making higher education purposeful and job-oriented, improving the quality of inputs into the 
education process (especially higher education) and installing a management layer in the education 
delivery system. Over the past few years, i.e. from 1999 onwards, the government has translated its 
commitment into a ‘Higher Education Commission’ (the largest resource center in education sector) 
whereby a small proportion of the population is being served and the masses are again deprived of 
their fundamental right to education. The underlying belief of the public sector, therefore, is in sharp 
contrast with the corroboration that the returns to education are endogenously determined through 
increases in average school attainment. Our analysis recommends that the public sector should focus 
on the provision of primary educational facilities for the masses rather than tertiary and higher 
education for a limited segment of the population. In the longer run, this would enable all to reap 
direct and indirect benefits from education. 
------------------------------------------------------ Table No 4 -------------------------------------------------- 
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Table No.1   The Distribution of No. Of Children Not Enrolled in Public  
Schools and NER’s By Gender and Province  
 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
 No. of 
Children NER 
No. of 
Children NER 
No. of 
Children NER 
No. of 
Children NER 
No. of 
Children NER 
No. of 
Children NER 
Sind 1.6548 0.646 1.8665 0.609 2.0112 0.573 2.3539 0.596 2.5095 0.568 2.7149 0.576 
Males 0.6876 0.515 0.7199 0.458 0.7435 0.413 0.8603 0.422 1.0257 0.446 1.1899 0.483 
Females 0.9672 0.788 1.1466 0.767 1.2677 0.741 1.4936 0.781 1.4838 0.699 1.5250 0.677 
Gender Gap  0.273   0.309   0.328   0.359   0.253   0.194 
Punjab 3.7809 0.594 4.2774 0.598 4.5607 0.559 3.9371 0.426 4.3655 0.420 5.3969 0.485 
Males 1.6991 0.508 1.9548 0.523 2.0433 0.481 1.7202 0.359 2.0482 0.380 2.6467 0.460 
Females 2.0818 0.689 2.3225 0.680 2.5174 0.644 2.2168 0.499 2.3172 0.462 2.7502 0.512 
Gender Gap  0.181   0.157   0.163   0.140   0.082   0.052 
NWFP 0.9003 0.569 1.0605 0.572 1.1713 0.547 0.9142 0.373 0.9551 0.343 1.2623 0.421 
Males 0.2857 0.350 0.3381 0.352 0.3512 0.316 0.0757 0.060 0.1553 0.107 0.3736 0.240 
Females 0.6146 0.804 0.7224 0.810 0.8201 0.795 0.8385 0.711 0.7998 0.596 0.8887 0.615 
Gender Gap  0.454   0.458   0.479   0.651   0.489   0.375 
Baluchistan 0.4123 0.794 0.6110 0.811 0.5982 0.682 0.6060 0.620 0.5701 0.527 0.5555 0.485 
Males 0.1810 0.679 0.2693 0.699 0.2211 0.487 0.2174 0.421 0.2382 0.407 0.2579 0.410 
Females 0.2312 0.916 0.3417 0.928 0.3771 0.892 0.3886 0.844 0.3319 0.669 0.2976 0.577 
Gender Gap  0.237   0.229   0.405   0.423   0.262   0.167 
Pakistan 6.7483 0.612 7.8153 0.609 8.3413 0.568 7.8112 0.470 8.4002 0.450 9.9295 0.497 
Males 2.8535 0.495 3.2821 0.493 3.3591 0.441 2.8736 0.333 3.4674 0.357 4.4681 0.430 
Females 3.8948 0.740 4.5332 0.734 4.9822 0.704 4.9376 0.618 4.9328 0.550 5.4615 0.570 
Gender Gap  0.245   0.241   0.263   0.285   0.193   0.140 
 
 * No. of Children are in Millions. The No Enrollment Ratios (NER) are calculated as 
indicated above 
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Table No. 2  Real Per-Capita GDP Growth and Ratio of Education Expenditures 
    (Current and Development) to GDP By Province 
 
  Sind Punjab NWFP Baluchistan Pakistan 
1975 Growth in Real Per Capita Income -2.41 0.48 -6.23 0.80 -0.94 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Current) to GDP 1.03 1.12 1.08 1.05 1.18 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Development) to GDP 0.16 0.31 0.38 0.03 0.45 
1980 Growth in Real Per Capita Income 4.64 1.37 3.41 1.07 2.77 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Current) to GDP 0.95 1.12 1.18 1.32 1.35 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Development) to GDP 0.13 0.15 0.54 0.05 0.40 
1985 Growth in Real Per Capita Income 4.03 2.90 5.16 1.53 3.49 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Current) to GDP 0.93 1.42 2.07 1.99 1.67 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Development) to GDP 0.17 0.22 0.55 0.70 0.49 
1990 Growth in Real Per Capita Income -4.48 7.03 0.83 13.30 2.90 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Current) to GDP 1.18 1.60 2.47 2.22 1.92 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Development) to GDP 0.28 0.24 0.53 0.67 0.56 
1995 Growth in Real Per Capita Income 2.67 3.90 3.81 3.46 3.52 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Current) to GDP 1.70 1.75 2.78 2.32 2.17 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Development) to GDP 0.19 0.25 1.16 1.12 0.41 
1998 Growth in Real Per Capita Income 0.93 4.74 0.82 1.78 3.07 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Current) to GDP 1.34 1.79 2.77 2.28 1.96 
 Ratio of Education Spending (Development) to GDP 0.09 0.20 0.45 0.74 0.26 
Source: Regional Accounts of Pakistan: 1973-1992, [Bengali, 1995] Regional Accounts of 
Pakistan: 1991-1995 [Bengali, 1997], Regional Accounts of Pakistan: 1973-2000 
[Bengali, 2002] and Fifty Years of Pakistan Statistics [F.B.S, 1998]. All figures are in 
percentage. 
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Table No. 3  Education Inequality Statistics for Selected Years By Province 
and Gender 
 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
 EG ASY SDS  EG ASY SDS  EG ASY SDS  EG ASY SDS  EG ASY SDS  EG ASY SDS  
Sind 0.227 2.33 3.63 0.212 2.49 3.66 0.195 2.69 3.74 0.185 2.85 3.99 0.180 2.91 4.00 0.177 2.97 4.10 
Males 0.181 2.89 3.85 0.167 3.10 3.84 0.154 3.34 3.88 0.144 3.57 4.16 0.148 3.48 4.16 0.150 3.46 4.28 
Females 0.323 1.63 3.21 0.301 1.76 3.30 0.280 1.89 3.38 0.273 1.94 3.57 0.241 2.20 3.67 0.224 2.36 3.79 
Punjab 0.229 2.29 3.17 0.233 2.26 3.19 0.206 2.53 3.36 0.161 3.17 3.53 0.160 3.19 3.54 0.165 3.13 3.67 
Males 0.178 2.91 3.40 0.183 2.83 3.41 0.166 3.09 3.56 0.137 3.66 3.64 0.143 3.52 3.60 0.151 3.40 3.73 
Females 0.361 1.45 2.60 0.348 1.51 2.71 0.292 1.80 2.93 0.204 2.55 3.27 0.185 2.79 3.43 0.185 2.81 3.57 
NWFP 0.268 1.96 2.80 0.286 1.84 2.74 0.275 1.91 2.82 0.203 2.55 3.10 0.181 2.84 3.19 0.192 2.71 3.25 
Males 0.180 2.84 3.05 0.192 2.67 3.01 0.184 2.78 3.11 0.140 3.50 3.15 0.134 3.68 3.29 0.147 3.43 3.40 
Females 0.647 0.80 1.89 0.696 0.75 1.84 0.699 0.74 1.82 0.427 1.23 2.50 0.317 1.66 2.61 0.303 1.74 2.77 
Baluchistan 0.562 0.93 2.23 0.582 0.89 2.23 0.417 1.25 2.50 0.325 1.62 2.82 0.268 1.96 3.00 0.260 2.02 2.96 
Males 0.374 1.40 2.62 0.384 1.37 2.63 0.278 1.87 2.83 0.222 2.33 3.15 0.203 2.56 3.30 0.212 2.46 3.23 
Females 0.997 0.38 1.49 0.996 0.35 1.49 0.995 0.52 1.76 0.766 0.68 1.94 0.462 1.13 2.27 0.371 1.41 2.42 
Pakistan 0.240 2.20 3.22 0.241 2.19 3.24 0.217 2.42 3.37 0.176 2.93 3.57 0.171 3.01 3.59 0.175 2.97 3.70 
Males 0.183 2.83 3.45 0.185 2.80 3.46 0.169 3.05 3.57 0.142 3.55 3.69 0.145 3.49 3.68 0.153 3.37 3.80 
Females 0.386 1.36 2.66 0.373 1.41 2.75 0.327 1.61 2.92 0.246 2.14 3.25 0.216 2.42 3.38 0.210 2.49 3.50 
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Table No. 4  Education, Its Distribution and Economic Growth 
 
Dependent Variable  : Growth in Real Per Capita GDP 
 
Panel Regression : Variables Stacked by Province 
 
Variables Plain OLS Estimates Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Lagged Real Per Capita GDP 
 
Average Schooling (Lag 1) 
 
Average Schooling (Lag 1) Square 
 
Change in Average Schooling 
 
Education Gini Coefficient 
 
Ratio of Education Expenditure (T) to 
GDP 
Intercept (s) 
 
 
 
 
-0.014995   * 
(0.015470) 
-0.312057 
(0.161583) 
0.051917 
(0.025549) 
0.348816 
(0.126353) 
-0.706010 
(0.358345) 
0.003125    * 
(0.003442) 
0.734550 
(0.330628) 
-0.069281   * 
(0.045041) 
-0.418137 
(0.181647) 
0.071665 
(0.028665) 
0.265840 
(0.125770) 
-0.844455 
(0.369555) 
0.018740 
(0.009032) 
1.34963      (SIN) 
1.31702      (PUN) 
1.29514      (NWF) 
1.29934      (BAL) 
1.31547      (PAK) 
-0.022352   * 
(0.018773) 
-0.314514 
(0.150289) 
0.052590 
(0.025051) 
0.338199 
(0.094375) 
-0.712231 
(0.292945) 
0.004665    * 
(0.004560) 
0.795234 
(0.308825) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2095 0.2933 0.2457 
Hetroscedasticity (LM Statistic) 
 
0.768281 
[0.381] 
2.06852 
[0.150] 
0.84314 
[0.358] 
Autocorrelation (DW Statistic) 
 
1.92860 
[0.161, 0.574] 
1.88998 
[0.113, 0.488] 
1.90011 
[0.125, 0.510] 
F-Test [ A, B = A i, Bi ] 1.4025 
[0.1180] 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
F-Test [ A i, B = A i, Bi ] _ _ _ _ 1.3099 
[0.1812] 
_ _ _ _ 
F-Test [ A, B = A i, B ] _ _ _ _ 1.8381 
[0.1263] 
_ _ _ _ 
Hausman Test: 
Random vs. Fixed Effects 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 17.975 
[0.0012] 
 
· All coefficients except marked with  *  are significant. 
· Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses, while P-
values are reported using square brackets. 
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Table No. 5  What Explains Education Inequality in Pakistan 
 
Dependent Variable  : Education Gini Coefficient 
Panel Regression : Variables Stacked by Province 
 
Variables Plain OLS Estimates Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Average Schooling Years 
 
Education Expenditure (Current) 
 
Education Expenditure (Development) 
 
Inertia Effect 
 
Intercept (s) 
 
 
 
 
-0.134259 
(0.025429) 
0.012650 
(0.002297) 
-0.011301 
(0.002047) 
0.576636 
(0.078115) 
0.182800 
(0.034239) 
-0.153300 
(.0302220) 
0.014010 
(0.002468) 
-0.010649 
(.0024243) 
0.572030 
(0.082216) 
0.189730     (SIN) 
0.185470     (PUN) 
0.186500     (NWF) 
0.176930     (BAL) 
0.185210     (PAK) 
-0.135219 
(0.018427) 
0.0128470 
(0.001818) 
-0.011373 
(0.001447) 
0.5775410 
(0.051082) 
0.1822590 
(0.023528) 
 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9935 0.9936 0.9935 
Hetroscedasticity (LM Statistic) 
 
35.2318 
[0.000] 
38.6710 
[0.000] 
34.3690 
[0.000] 
F-Test [ A, B = A i, Bi ] 12.235 
[0.000] 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
F-Test [ A i, B = A i, Bi ] _ _ _ _ 14.154 
[0.000] 
_ _ _ _ 
F-Test [ A, B = A i, B ] _ _ _ _ 1.6202 
[0.1738] 
_ _ _ _ 
Hausman Test: 
Random vs. Fixed Effects 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5.0899 
[0.1653] 
· All coefficients except marked with  *  are significant. 
· Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses, while P-
values are reported using square brackets. 
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Table No. 6  Education Inequality in Pakistan: Gender Disaggregated Results 
Dependent Variable  : Education Gini Coefficient 
Panel Regression : Variables Stacked by Province 
 
 
Variables Plain OLS Estimates Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Average Schooling Years 
 
Education Expenditure (Current 
 
Education Expenditure (Development) 
 
Inertia Effect 
 
Intercept (s) 
 
 
 
 
-0.14682 
(0.01846) 
0.00725 
(0.00106) 
-0.00644 
(0.00108) 
0.38945 
(0.07748) 
0.25147 
(0.03183) 
-0.12157 
(.05799) 
0.032292 
(0.01409) 
-0.03285 
(0.01145) 
0.76931 
(0.09721) 
0.08280 
0.03223 
-0.17245 
(0.02070) 
0.00848 
(0.00114) 
-0.00581 
(0.00128) 
0.35795 
(0.07312) 
0.27543 
0.27021 
0.27432 
0.26559 
0.27010 
-0.13318 
(0.06678) 
0.03241 
(0.01486) 
-0.03086 
(0.01197) 
0.78910 
(0.11115) 
0.07472 
0.07111 
0.05866 
0.04330 
0.77391 
-0.15580 
(0.01313) 
0.00790 
(0.00092) 
-0.00649 
(0.00084) 
0.37333 
(0.04885) 
0.25926 
(0.02116) 
-0.12043 
(0.03055) 
0.03195 
(0.00739) 
-0.03258 
(0.00566) 
0.77249 
(0.04593) 
0.08351 
(0.02792) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9933 0.9909 0.9939 0.9910 0.9932 0.9909 
Hetroscedasticity (LM Statistic) 26.4852 
[0.000] 
43.8180 
[0.000] 
28.9403 
[0.000] 
44.7084 
[0.000] 
20.2401 
[0.000] 
43.0624 
[0.000] 
F-Test [ A, B = A i, Bi ] 20.311 
[0.000] 
6.9596 
[0.000] 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
F-Test [ A i, B = A i, Bi ] _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ 21.760 
[0.000] 
7.9769 
[0.000] 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
F-Test [ A, B = A i, B ] _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ 3.7576 
[0.0065] 
1.4729 
[0.2149] 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Hausman Test: 
Random vs. Fixed Effects 
_ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2.0178 
[0.3646] 
0.42600 
[0.9348] 
· All coefficients except marked with  *  are significant. 
· Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses, while P-
values are reported using square brackets. 
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Table No. 7   Education Kuznets Curve 
Dependent Variable  : Standard Deviation of Schooling 
Panel Regression : Variables Stacked by Province and By Year 
 
 
By Province By Time Period 
Variables Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Average Schooling Years 
 
Average Schooling Years (sq) 
 
Inertia Effect 
 
Intercept (s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.40364 
(0.08906) 
-0.04664 
(0.01284) 
0.66337 
(0.06961) 
0.55636 
0.41087 
0.34410 
0.42609 
0.44189 
0.19316 
(0.05228) 
-0.02555 
(0.00915) 
0.87903 
(0.03499) 
0.11045   * 
(0.06575) 
1.23055 
(0.04796) 
-0.14874 
(0.01276) 
0.18151 
(0.02026) 
1975:  0.64791 
1980:  0.66591 
1985:  0.64313 
1990:  0.60716 
1991:  0.60466 
1992:  0.60713 
1993:  0.58704 
1994:  0.57234 
1995:  0.56601 
1996:  0.57717 
1997:  0.59913 
1998:  0.62834 
1.24204 
(0.05293) 
-0.15355 
(0.01230) 
0.17139 
(0.01630) 
0.66132 
(0.06303) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9939 0.9909 0.8999 0.9048 
Hetroscedasticity (LM Statistic) 
 
0.091526 
[0.762] 
0.61574 
[0.433] 
26.2506 
[0.000] 
29.8636 
[0.000] 
F-Test [ A i, B = A i, Bi ] 5.5283 
[0.000] 
_ _ _ _ 0.16654 
[1.000] 
_ _ _ _ 
F-Test [ A, B = A i, B ] 8.1484 
[0.000] 
_ _ _ _ 0.30099 
[0.9996] 
_ _ _ _ 
Hausman Test: 
Random vs. Fixed Effects 
_ _ _ _ 26.443 
[0.000] 
_ _ _ _ 3.2244 
[0.1994] 
· All coefficients except marked with  *  are significant. 
· Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses, while P-
values are reported using square brackets. 
 
 
 
